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Abstract
This paper proposed the application of post-encryption-compression (PEC) to strengthen the secrecy in the case of
distributed encryption where the encryption keys are correlated to each other. We derive the universal code construction
for the compression and the rate region where codes with achievability and secrecy are obtainable.
Our main technique is to use affine encoders which are constructed from certain linear encoders to encode the
ciphertexts before sending them to public communication channels. We show that if the rates of linear codes are
within a certain rate region:(1) information leakage on the original sources from the encoded ciphertexts without the
keys is negligible, while (2) one who has legitimate keys is able to retrieve the original source data with negligible
error probability.
Keywords
Distributed encryption, Slepian-Wolf network, secrecy amplification, affine encoders
I. INTRODUCTION
Background
In this paper, we consider the problem of strenghtening the security of communication in multi-source single-
destination network. Especially, we are interested on practical solutions with minimum modifications which can
be applied even on already running systems. More precisely, we consider a network system described as follows:
multiple sources X1 and X2 are processed in separated nodes, and then sent through their respective public commu-
nication channels to a joint sink node. Now suppose that an already running system has a potential secrecy/privacy
problem such that (X1, X2) might be leaked to an adversary which is eavesdropping all public communication
channel.
A common measure to prevent the leaking of (X1, X2) to such eavesdropper is by encrypting each source using
one time pad encryption in its respective corresponding node before it is sent to the public channel. For i = 1, 2, let
Xi be encrypted using key Ki into Ci = Xi⊕Ki. Instead of sending X1 and X2, the system sends the ciphertexts C1
and C2 to public communication channels. Obviously, if K1 and K2 are ideally generated such that each is following
uniform distribution and is independent to each other, no problem is left as H(X1X2|C1C2) = H(X1X2) holds
automatically. Note that this means that the pair of ciphertexts (C1, C2) does not give any additional information
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2about (X1, X2) and thus no one is able to reveal (X1, X2) using (C1, C2) with a better success probability than
that of randomly guessing (X1, X2) based on the distribution of (X1, X2) only (without knowing (C1, C2)).
Problem Framework: Secrecy/Privacy Guarantee under Correlated Keys in Distributed Encryption
However, in real world, there is no guarantee that keys are always ideally generated, and encryption keys in a
system might be correlated to each other. It is easy to see that if K1 and K2 are correlated to each other, i.e.,
H(K1|K2) < H(K1), the following automatically holds:
H(X1X2|C1C2) < H(X1X2). (1)
Notice that the inequation (1) means that we are posed with a security challenge. The first reason is that (1) means
that we can no longer directly guarantee that the ciphertexts in pair, i.e., (C1, C2), do not give additional information
about (X1, X2) to the eavesdropper. Furthermore, (1) still holds although K1 and K2 are generated randomly from
uniform distribution over their respective domain such that any single separated ciphertext do not reveal additional
information about the corresponding source data, i.e., H(Xi|Ci) = H(Xi) for i = 1, 2. In other words, we lost the
security guarantee for secrecy against eavesdroppers which access all public communication channels when key
are correlated to each other.
Here, we restate our research problem into the following question: Is there any method which: (1) strengthens
the secrecy such that it can guarantee that under the condition shown by inequation (1) the eavesdropper can not
easily extract (X1, X2) from (C1, C2), and (2) is implementable with small cost even on already running systems?
Search for Solution
Since the root of the problem posed by (1) is the correlation between the keys K1 and K2, it is natural to think
that if we can somehow reduce the effect of correlation between K1 and K2 in (C1, C2), then we might be able
to amplify the secrecy to an extent that we can guarantee a certain level of secrecy close to perfect secrecy.
Naïve method (Additional New Secret Randomness): A naïve method to reduce the correlation between K1 and K2
is by introducing additional independent randomness to each node. For example, we can put additional independently
generated randomness R1 and R2 to each node respectively, and use K1 ⊕ R1 and K2 ⊕ R2 as the new inputs
as keys to the encryption. However, this method has serious drawbacks. Firstly, it requires new private channels
to send the randomness and secondly, it requires each node to bear additional security costs that each node has
additional private storage to keep the new randomness securely in private manner. We conclude that this naïve
method is not feasible to implement in real world, especially for an already running system and for a system with
nodes of lightweight devices such as wireless sensors.
Since a simple additional secret randomness technique as above sounds impractical in real world, we need to
find approach to reduce the effect of correlation between K1 and K2 in (C1, C2) without new secret randomness.
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3Fundamental Idea for Practical Solution: Compression of Keys
Our fundamental idea for solution is based on our intuition that the correlation between compressed keys is smaller
than correlation of uncompressed keys. We can explain our intuition as follows. First, recall that the amount of
correlation between two random sources K1,K2 is directly proportional to the mutual information between K1
and K2, i.e., I(K1;K2).1For simplicity, let K1 and K2 are taking values from the same set of n dimensional
vectors Kn. Let ϕ be a mapping from Kn onto a set of m dimensional vectors Km, where where n > m. One
may simply treat ϕ as a kind of compression function. Using the fact that H(K2|ϕ(K1)) ≥ H(K2|K1) and
H(ϕ(K1)|ϕ(K2)) ≥ H(ϕ(K1)|K2) hold, it is easy to derive the following inequations.
I(K1;K2) ≥ I(ϕ(K1),K2) ≥ I(ϕ(K1);ϕ(K2)). (2)
The above inequations (2) basically says that compressing the keys (K1,K2) may reduce the effect of correlation
between them. Thus, one immediate approach is to compress the keys directly before inputting them into the
encryption process.
Infeasibility of Direct Compression of Keys: However, recall that there are two points of inputs to the encryption in
each node, i.e., source and key, Thus, if we want to use the compressed keys as the new keys to the encryption, in
order to guarantee secrecy, in general, we also have to compress the messages. Especially in the case of one-time
pad encryption, we need to compress the messages to an extent that the lengths are same with the compressed
keys. This means we have to perform compression two times for each node. Moreover, in real world, the devices
at the nodes might have the keys hardwired into the electronic circuit, and thus modification of the keys before the
encryption will require us a special technique to perform a hardware intrusion without bringing down the already
running system. Obviously, this kind of modification is risky or impossible in some cases. Therefore, we conclude
that direct compression of keys at the point of inputs to encryption is practically infeasible in general.
Hence, we narrow the research question into the following: Can we find a better method for compression such
that we do not need to modify inputs of encryption directly and requires less number of compressions than two
times for each node?
Proposed Solution: Indirect Compression of Keys through Compression of Ciphertexts using Affine Encoders
The main result in this paper is that we discover a method to perform compression on the keys indirectly by
compressing the ciphertexts. We only need to perform the compression only once for each node and thus the
implementation cost is only about half of the method which performs compressions on inputs before encryption
described above. The core of our discovery is the specific construction of an affine encoder as a good compression
function. We prove that the result of compression of a ciphertext from one-time pad encryption using our affine
encoder can be seen as one-time pad encryption of a compressed message with a compressed key.
1Also recall that when K1 and K2 are independent and have no correlation, I(K1;K2) = 0 holds, while if K1 and K2 are not independent
and have some correlation, I(K1;K2) > 0.
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4As a illustration, for i-th node (i = 1, 2), let affine encoder ϕi be associated with a linear encoder φi and a
vector ai, and let ϕi be defined such that ϕi(x) = φi(x)⊕ ai. Using ϕi, we compress the ciphertext of i-th node,
Ci = Xi⊕Ki, into C˜i = ϕi(Xi⊕Ki) = φ(Xi⊕Ki)⊕ ai. Thanks to the homomorphic property of linear encoder
φi, we can expand φi(Xi ⊕Ki) into φ(Xi)⊕ φi(Ki) and we obtain the following equation.
C˜i = ϕi(Ci) = ϕi(Xi ⊕Ki) = φi(Xi)⊕ φi(Ki)⊕ ai = φi(Xi)⊕ ϕi(Ki) = φi(Xi)⊕ K˜i. (3)
Here we set K˜i := ϕi(Ki), i = 1, 2. We can see φi(Xi) as the compressed source and K˜i as the compressed key.
Hence, an eavesdropper which collects (C˜1, C˜2) from public communication channels will see (Y1, Y2) as results
of one-time pad encryption with compressed keys (ϕ1(K1), ϕ2(K2)) which has less correlation compared to the
original keys (K1,K2).
We borrow the technique of Oohama [1] on generating randomness using Slepian-Wolf coding [2] to make the
joint distribution of compressed keys which are hidden within the compressed ciphertexts exponentially close to the
uniform distribution that the effect of correlation between the keys becomes negligible. Furthermore, we borrow
the result of Csiszár [3] to show that we can obtain good linear encoders and decoders such that in joint sink node
the original sources data can be retrieved with exponentially negligible error probability.
We prove that the code construction can be made to depend on only transmission rates using the universal code
technique. As far as our knowledge, our result is the first to show explicitly that the preserving of code structure
which is the property of affine encoders constructed from linear encoders is essential in order to amplify the secrecy
and to preserve the achievability at the same time in the case of distributed encodings/encryption. One can see that
our result is in parallel with the existing work of Körner and Marton [4] in the sense that [4] shows that the
preserving of code structure by linear encoders is essential in order to prove the optimal transmission rate in the
case of two helper network systems.
Practical Feasibility of Proposed Solution
In practice, our approach does not require hardware intrusion to the terminal devices. We can modify the output
of the encryption easily by simply connecting the already existing device in each node with an additional external
equipment which is capable to receive the ciphertext from the encryption process as inputs, encode them using
specified linear codes, and then finally output the encoded ciphertext to the public communication channel. In order
to prevent that the leak of pre-encoded original ciphertexts to the eavesdropper in the case of wireless communication,
we can apply a simple idea to enclose the existing device and the additional equipment in a Faraday cage so that
no electronic signal carrying the pre-encoded ciphertexts leaks outside.
On modification of joint sink node: We remark that our proposed solution which will be described in detail at
later sections actually requires the modification of the input and the output of the joint sink node. We argue that
despite this requirement, our approach is still feasible and practical. We can consider the joint sink node as a kind
of information processing center in real world. And it is quite natural to assume that in such center, the processing
tasks are carried by general-purpose machines with high modularity, that the components are easy to be separated,
modified, and recombined without disrupting the already running system.
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5Related Works
Randomness generation problem in distributed networks with multi-terminals has been researched by Muramatsu
et al. [5], Oohama [1]. However, these works only focus on the secrecy and randomness issue and do not take into
account the issue of achievability. Csiszár has shown in [3] that one can easily use linear codes to construct universal
coding for all achievable rates in Slepian-Wolf networks. However, this work only focus on the achievability and
do not touch security related issues.
Johnson et al. [6] has proposed a model similar to our setting in a sense that they try to reach both achievability
and secrecy at the same time using a similar encryption-then-compress paradigm. However, they only focused on
achieving achievability and secrecy using a specific kind of encoders and compression method and they do not
show whether the encoders and compression method satisfy the universality. In this paper, we show a more general
results in the sense that we show that any good linear encoder which attain random coding error exponent can be
used to construct compression function which satisfy both achievability and secrecy and also we show that our
construction satisfies the universality. Moreover, Johnson et al [6] only consider secrecy in asymptotic setting, while
in this paper we consider the secrecy in concrete setting with concrete exponential upper bound of the success
probability of an eavesdropper revealing the sources from compressed ciphertexts in public channel.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we show the basic notations and related consensus used in this paper. Also, we explain the basic
system setting and basic adversarial model we consider in this paper.
Random Sources of Information and Keys: Let (X1, X2) be a pair of random variables from a finite set X1×X2.
Let {(X1,t, X2,t)}∞t=1 be a stationary discrete memoryless source(DMS) such that for each t = 1, 2, . . ., the pair
(X1,t, X2,t) takes values in finite set X1 × X2 and obeys the same distribution as that of (X1, X2) denoted by
PX1X2 = {PX1X2(x1, x2)}(x1,x2)∈X1×X2 . The stationary DMS {(X1,t, X2,t)}∞t=1 is specified with PX1X2 . Also,
let (K1,K2) be pair of random variables taken from the same finite set X1×X2 representing the pair of keys used
for encryption at two separate terminals, of which the detailed description will be presented later. Similarly, let
{(K1,t,K2,t)}∞t=1 be a stationary discrete memoryless source such that for each t = 1, 2, . . ., the pair (K1,t, XK,t)
takes values in finite set X1 × X2 and obeys the same distribution as that of (K1,K2) denoted by PK1K2 =
{PK1K2(k1, k2)}(k1,k2)∈X1×X2 . The stationary DMS {(K1,t,K2,t)}∞t=1 is specified with PK1K2 .
Random Variables and Sequences: We write the sequence of random variables with length n from the information
source as follows: X1 := X1,1X1,2 · · ·X1,n, X2 := X2,1X2,2 · · ·X2,n. Similarly, the strings with length n
of Xn1 and Xn2 are written as x1 := x1,1x1,2 · · ·x1,n ∈ Xn1 and x2 := x2,1x2,2 · · ·x2,n ∈ Xn2 respectively.
For (x1,x2) ∈ Xn1 × Xn2 , PX1X2(x1,x2) stands for the probability of the occurrence of (x1,x2). When the
information source is memoryless specified with PX1X2 , we have the following equation holds: PX1X2(x1,x2) =∏n
t=1 PX1X2(x1,t, x2,t). In this case we write PX1X2(x1,x2) as P
n
X1X2
(x1,x2). Similar notations are used for
other random variables and sequences.
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Fig. 1. Separate encryption of two corelated sources with joint decryption.
Consensus and Notations: Without loss of generality, throughout this paper, we assume that X1 and X2 are finite
fields. The notation ⊕ is used to denote the field addition operation, while the notation 	 is used to denote the
field subtraction operation, i.e., a	 b = a⊕ (−b) for any elements a, b of a same finite field. All discussions and
theorems in this paper still hold although X1 and X2 are different finite fields. However, for the sake of simplicity,
we use the same notation for field addition and subtraction for both X1 and X2.
A. Basic System Description
First, let the information sources and keys be generated independently by different parties Sgen and Kgen
respectively. In our setting, we assume the followings.
• The random keys K1 and K2 are generated by Kgen from uniform distribution.
• The key K1 is correlated to K2.
• The sources X1 and X2 are generated by Sgen and are correlated to each other.
• The sources are independent to the keys.
Next, let the two correlated random sources X1 and X2 from Sgen be sent to two separated nodes L1 and L2
respectively. And let two random key (sources) K1 and K2 from Kgen be also sent separately to L1 and L2.
Further settings of our system are described as follows, as shown in Fig. 1.
1) Distributed Sources Processing:At node 1, X1 is encrypted with the key K1 using encryption scheme Enc1,
and at node 2, X2 is encrypted with the key K2 using encryption scheme Enc2. The ciphertexts Ci, i = 1, 2
are defined by
Ci := Enci(Xi,Ki) = Xi ⊕Ki.
2) Transmission: Next, the ciphertexts C1 and C2 are sent to a common information processing center D
through two separated public communication channels. Meanwhile, the keys K1 and K2 are sent to D
through private communication channels.
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73) Joint Sink Node Processing: In D, we decrypt the ciphertexts (C1,C2) using the keys (K1,K2) through
the corresponding decryption procedure Deci, i = 1, 2 which is defined by Deci(Ci,Ki) = (Ci 	Ki) for
i = 1, 2. It is obvious that for each i = 1, 2, we can correctly reproduce the source outputs Xi from Ci and
Ki by the decription function Deci.
Eavesdropper Adversarial Model (Informal Description)
An eavesdropper adversary A eavesdrops all public communication channels in the system and output/estimate
the original data from information sources.
III. PROPOSED IDEA: AFFINE ENCODERS AS PRIVACY AMPLIFIER
Let φ(n) := (φ(n)1 , φ
(n)
2 ) be a pair of linear mappings φ
(n)
1 : Xn1 → Xm11 and φ(n)2 : Xn2 → Xm22 . For each
i = 1, 2, we define the mapping φ(n)i Xni → Xmii by
φ
(n)
i (xi) = xiAi for xi ∈ Xni , (4)
where Ai is a matrix with n rows and mi columns. For each i = 1, 2, entries of Ai are from Xi. We fix bmii ∈ Xmii ,
i = 1, 2. For each i = 1, 2, define the mapping ϕ(n)i : Xni → Xmii by
ϕ
(n)
i (ki) := φ
(n)
i (ki)⊕ bmii = kiAi ⊕ bmii ,
for ki ∈ Xni . (5)
For each i = 1, 2, the mapping ϕ(n)i is called the affine mapping induced by the linear mapping φ
(n)
i and constant
vector bmii ∈ Xmi . By the definition (5) of ϕ(n)i , i = 1, 2, those satisfy the following affine structure:
ϕ
(n)
i (xi ⊕ ki) = (xi ⊕ ki)Ai ⊕ bmii
= xiAi ⊕ (kiAi ⊕ bmii ) = φ(n)i (xi)⊕ ϕ(n)i (ki),
for xi,ki ∈ Xni . (6)
Set ϕ(n) := (ϕ(n)1 , ϕ
(n)
2 ). Next, let ψ
(n) be the corresponding joint decoder for φ(n) such that ψ(n) : Xm11 ×Xm22 →
Xn1 ×Xn2 . Note that ψ(n) does not have a linear structure in general.
Description of Proposed procedure : We describe the procedure of our privacy amplified system as follows.
1) Encoding of Ciphertexts: First, we use ϕ(n)1 and ϕ
(n)
2 to encode the ciphertexts C
n
1 = X
n
1 ⊕ Kn1 and
Cn2 = X
n
2 ⊕Kn2 . Let C˜mii = ϕ(n)i (Ci) for i = 1, 2. Then, instead of sending C1 and C2, we send C˜m11
and C˜m22 to public communication channel. By the affine structure (6) of encoders we have that for each
i = 1, 2,
C˜mii = ϕ
(n)
i (Xi ⊕Ki) = φ(n)i (Xi)⊕ ϕ(n)i (Ki)
= X˜mii ⊕ K˜mii , (7)
where X˜mii := φ
(n)
i (Xi), K˜
mi
i := ϕ
(n)
i (Ki).
2) Decoding at Joint Sink Node D: First, using the pair of linear encoders (ϕ(n)1 , ϕ
(n)
2 ), D encodes the keys
(K1,K2) which are received through private channel into (K˜m11 , K˜
m2
2 ) = (ϕ
(n)
1 (K1), ϕ
(n)
2 (K2)). Receiving
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Fig. 2. Our proposed solution: linear encoders as privacy amplifiers.
(C˜m11 , C˜
m2
2 ) from public communication channel, D computes X˜
mi
i , i = 1, 2 in the following way. From (7),
we have that for each i = 1, 2, the decoder D can obtain X˜mii = φ
(n)
i (Xi) by subtracting K˜
mi
i = ϕ
(n)
i (Ki)
from C˜mii . Finally, D outputs (X̂1, X̂2) by applying the joint decoder ψ
(n) to (X˜m11 , X˜
m2
2 ) as follows:
(X̂1, X̂2) = (ψ
(n)(X˜m11 , X˜
m2
2 ))
= (ψ(n)(φ
(n)
1 (X1), φ
(n)
2 (X2)). (8)
Our privacy amplified system described above is illustrated in Fig. 2.
On Reliability
From (8), it is clear that the decoding error probability pe is as follows:
pe = pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2)
:= Pr[ψ(n)(φ
(n)
1 (X1), φ
(n)
2 (X2)) 6= (X1,X2)].
On Security
An eavesdropper A tries to estimate (X1,X2) ∈ Xn1 ×Xn2 from (C˜m11 , C˜m22 ) = (ϕ(n)1 (X1 ⊕K1), ϕ(n)2 (X2 ⊕
K2)) ∈ Xm11 × Xm22 . The information leakage ∆(n) on (X1,X2) from (C˜m11 , C˜m22 ) is measured by the mutual
information between those two random pairs. This quantity is formally defined by
∆(n) =∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2)
:=I(C˜m11 , C˜
m2
2 ;X1,X2).
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9Reliable and Secure Framework
Definition 1: The quantity (R1, R2, F,G) is achievable for the system Sys if there exists a sequence {(ϕ(n),
ψ(n))}n≥1 such that ∀δ > 0, ∃n0 = n0(δ) ∈ N0, ∀n ≥ n0,
1
n
log |Xmii | =
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri, i = 1, 2,
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) ≤ 2−n(F−δ),
∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) ≤ 2−n(G−δ).
Definition 2: (Rate Reliability and Security
Region) Let DSys(PX1X2 ,PK1K2) denote the set of all (R1, R2, F,G) such that (R1, R2, F,G) is achievable. We
call DSys(PX1X2 ,PK1K2) the rate reliability and security region.
Definition 3 (Reliable and Secure Rate Region): We define the reliable and secure rate region RSys(PX1X2 ,
PK1K2) for the system Sys by
RSys(PX1X2 , PK1K2) := {(R1, R2) : (R1, R2, F,G)
∈ DSys(PX1X2 , PK1K2) for some F,G > 0}.
We call RSys(PX1X2 ,PK1K2) the reliable and secure rate region.
In this paper we derive good inner bounds of DSys( PX1X2 , PK1K2) and RSys(PX1X2 , PK1K2).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we state our main results. To describe our results we define several functions and sets. Let X1 and
X2 be arbitrary random variables over X1 and X2 respectively and PX1X2 is their joint distribution. Let P(X1×X2)
denote the set of all probability distributions on X1×X2. Similar notations are adopted for other random variables.
For R ≥ 0 and PX1X2 ∈ P(X1 ×X2), we define the following three functions:
F1(R|PX1X2) : = min
PX1X2
∈P(X1×X2)
{[R−H(X1|X2)]+
+D(PX1X2 ||PX1X2)},
F2(R|PX1X2) : = min
PX1X2
∈P(X1×X2)
{[R−H(X2|X1)]+
+D(PX1X2 ||PX1X2)},
F3(R|PX1X2) : = min
PX1X2
∈P(X1×X2)
{[R−H(X1X2)]+
+D(PX1X2 ||PX1X2)},
where [a]+ : = max{0, a}. Furthermore, define
F (R1, R2|PX1X2) := min
i=1,2,3
Fi(Ri|PX1X2),
where R3 := R1 +R2. For random variable Z with distributions PZ on finite set Z and any R > 0, we define the
following function:
G(R|PZ) := min
PZ∈P(Z)
{[H(Z)−R]+ +D(PZ ||PZ)}.
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For given PK1K2 ∈ P(X1 ×X2), we define
G(R1, R2|PK1K2) := min{G(R1|PK1), G(R2|PK2),
G(R3|PK1K2)}.
Let us define the following two regions of (R1, R2):
Rsw(PX1X2) :={(R1, R2) :
R1 > H(X1|X2), R2 > H(X2|X1),
R1 +R2 > H(X1X2)},
Rkey(PK1K2) :={(R1, R2) :
R1 < H(K1), R2 < H(K2),
R1 +R2 < H(K1K2)}.
Then we have the following property:
Property 1:
a) F (R1, R2, PX1X2) > 0 if and only if (R1, R2) ∈ Rsw(PX1X2).
b) G(R1, R2, PK1K2) > 0 if and only if (R1, R2) ∈ Rkey(PX1X2).
Our main result is as follows.
Theorem 1: For any R1, R2 > 0, there exists a sequence of mappings {(ϕ(n), ψ(n))}∞n=1 such that for any
(PX1X2 , PK1K2) with (R1, R2) ∈ Rsw(PX1X2) ∩Rkey( PK1K2), we have
1
n
log |Xmii | =
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri, i = 1, 2,
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) ≤ 2−n[F (R1,R2|PX1X2 )−δ1,n], (9)
∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) ≤ 2−n[G(R1,R2|PK1K2 )−δ2,n], (10)
where δi,n, i = 1, 2 are defined by
δ1,n :=
1
n
log
[
24(n+ 1)3|X1||X2|
]
,
δ2,n :=
1
n
log
[
6(log e)[log(|X1||X2|)]
× n(n+ 1)3|X1||X2|
]
.
Note that for i = 1, 2, δi,n → 0 as n→∞.
The functions F (R1, R2|PX1X2) and G(R1, R2|PK1 K2) take positive values if and only if (R1, R2) ∈ Rsw(
PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2). Thus, by Theorem 1, under (R1, R2) ∈ Rsw( PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2), we have the
followings:
• On the reliability, pe(φ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent is
lower bounded by the function F (R1, R2|PX1X2).
• On the security, ∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent
is lower bounded by the function G(R1, R2|PK1K2),
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Fig. 3. The inner bound Rsw(PX1X2 ) ∩Rkey(PK1K2 ) of the reliable and secure rate region RSys(PX1X2 , PK1K2 ).
• The code that attains the exponent functions F ( R1, R2|PX1X2) and G(R1, R2|PK1K2) is the universal code
that depends only on (R1, R2) not on the value of the distribution PX1X2 and PK1K2 .
Define
R(in)Sys (PX1X2 , PK1K2) := Rsw(PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2),
D(in)Sys (PX1X2 , PK1K2) := {(R1, R2,
F (R1, R2|PX1X2), G(R1, R2|PK1K2)) :
(R1, R2) ∈ Rsw(PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2)}.
From Theorem 1, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1:
R(in)Sys (PX1X2 , PK1K2) ⊆ RSys(PX1X2 , PK1K2),
D(in)Sys (PX1X2 , PK1K2) ⊆ DSys(PX1X2 , PK1K2).
A typical shape of Rsw(PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2) is shown in Fig. 3.
V. SECURITY CRITERION BASED ON THE CORRECT PROBABILITY OF DECODING
On Security
An eavesdropper A who tries to estimate (X1,X2) ∈ Xn1 ×Xn2 from
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(C˜m11 , C˜
m2
2 ) = (ϕ
(n)
1 (X1Λ1 ⊕K1), ϕ(n)2 (X2Λ2 ⊕K2)) ∈ Xm11 ×Xm22
is always associated with its estimator function ψA defined by
ψA : Xm11 ×Xm22 → Xn1 ×Xn2 . (11)
For given (PnX1X2 , P
n
K1K2
), let pc(ϕ(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) denote the success probability of A correctly estimating
(X1,X2) from (Y m11 , Y
m2
2 ) using its estimation function ψA with respect to the pair of linear encoders ϕ
(n) =
(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 ), under (P
n
X1X2
, PnK1K2).
Reliable and Secure Framework
Definition 4: The quantity (R1, R2, F,G) is achievable for the system Sys if there exists a sequence {(ϕ(n),
ψ(n))}n≥1 such that ∀δ > 0, ∃n0 = n0(δ) ∈ N0, ∀n ≥ n0,
1
n
log |Xmii | =
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri, i = 1, 2, pe(φ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) ≤ 2−n(F−δ), (12)
and for any eavesdropper A with ψA:
pc(ϕ
(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) ≤ 2−n(G−δ). (13)
Definition 5 (Rate Reliablity and Security Region): We define the rate reliability and security region D˜Sys(PX1
X2 , PK1K2) for the system Sys by
D˜Sys(PX1X2 , PK1K2) := {(R1, R2, F,G) (R1, R2, F,G) is achievable for Sys} . (14)
Definition 6 (Reliable and Secure Rate Region): We define the reliable and secure rate region R˜Sys(PX1X2 ,
PK1K2) for the system Sys by
R˜Sys(PX1X2 , PK1K2) :=
{
(R1, R2) | (R1, R2, F,G) ∈ D˜Sys(PX1X2 , PK1K2) for some F,G > 0
}
. (15)
Our aim is to derive good inner bounds of D˜Sys(PX1X2 , PK1K2) and R˜Sys(PX1X2 , PK1K2). To describe our result
we define a quantity related to a correct probability of source estimation.
Definition 7 (Source Uniformity): Let us define the following quantity:
P ∗X1X2 := max(x1,x2)∈Xn1 ×Xn2
PnX1X2(x1,x2). (16)
Let Pmax := max(x1,x2)∈X1×X2 PX1X2(x1, x2). Then, by simple computation we have
P ∗X1X2 = P
n
max = 2
−n log 1Pmax . (17)
We state the following lemma which is implied directly by the results of Oohama [7].
Lemma 1: Fix positive ν arbitrary. In the proposed system, for any pair of encoder ϕ(n) = (ϕ(n)1 , ϕ
(n)
2 ), for any
eavesdropper A with estimator function ψA, the following holds.
pc(ϕ
(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) ≤ 2ν · P ∗X1X2 +
1
ν
I(C˜m11 C˜
m2
2 ;X1X2)
= 2ν · 2−n log 1Pmax + 1
ν
∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2). (18)
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Since the proof of Lemma 1 is found in Oohama [7], we omit the detail of the proof. Choosing ν = 1 in (18),
we have
pc(ϕ
(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) ≤ 2 · 2−n log
1
Pmax + ∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2). (19)
From (19) and Theorem 1, we have the following result.
Theorem 2: For any R1, R2 > 0, there exists a sequence of mappings {(ϕ(n), ψ(n))}∞n=1 such that for any
(PX1X2 , PK1K2) with (R1, R2) ∈ Rsw(PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2), we have
1
n
log |Xmii | =
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri, i = 1, 2,
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) ≤ 2−n[F (R1,R2|PX1X2 )−δ1,n], (20)
and for any eavesdropper A with ψA:
pc(ϕ
(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) ≤ 2 · 2−n log
1
Pmax + 2−n[G(R1,R2|PK1K2 )−δ2,n], (21)
where δi,n, i = 1, 2 are the same quantities as those in Theorem 1. Note that for i = 1, 2, δi,n → 0 as n→∞.
The functions F (R1, R2|PX1X2) and G(R1, R2|PK1K2) take positive values if and only if (R1, R2) ∈ Rsw(
PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2). Thus, by Theorem 1, under (R1, R2) ∈ Rsw(PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2), we have the
followings:
• On the achievability, pe(φ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent
is lower bounded by the function F (R1, R2|PK1K2).
• On the security, for any ψA, pc(ϕ(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity,
and its exponent is lower bounded by the function G∗(R1, R2|PK1K2), where
G∗(R1, R2|PK1K2) = min
{
log
1
Pmax
, G(R1, R2|PK1K2)
}
.
• The code that attains the exponent functions F (R1, R2|PX1X2) and G∗(R1, R2|PK1K2) is the universal code
that depends only on (R1, R2) not on the value of the distribution PX1X2 and PK1K2 .
Define
D˜(in)Sys (PX1X2 , PK1K2) :={(R1, R2, F (R1, R2|PX1X2), G∗(R1, R2|PK1K2)) :
(R1, R2) ∈ Rsw(PX1X2) ∩Rkey(PK1K2)}. (22)
From Theorem 1, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2:
R(in)Sys (PX1X2 , PK1K2) ⊆ R˜Sys(PX1X2 , PK1K2),
D˜(in)Sys (PX1X2 , PK1K2) ⊆ D˜Sys(PX1X2 , PK1K2).
VI. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT
In this section we prove Theorems 1 and 2. To prove this theorem we use the method of types developed by
Csiszár and Körner [8]. In the first subsection we prepare basic results on the types. Those results are basic tools
for our analysis of several quantities related to error provability of decoding or security. In the second subsection
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we evaluate upper bounds of pe(ϕ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) and pc(ϕ(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2). We derive the upper bound
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) which holds for any (φ(n), ψ(n)). This result is stated in Lemma 4. Furthermore we derive
the upper bound of pc(ϕ(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) which holds for any ϕ(n) and any adversary A with ψA. This
result is stated in Lemma 7. In the third subsection we develop random coding argument to prove an important key
lemma (Lemma 11) stating an existence of good universal code (ϕ(n), ψ(n)). In the fourth subsection we prove
Theorem 1 using Lemma 4, Lemma 7, and Lemma 11.
A. Types of Sequences and Their Properties
In this subsection we prepare basic results on the types. Those results are basic tools for our analysis of several
bounds related to error provability of decoding or security.
Definition 8: For any n-sequence x1 = x1,1x1,2 · · · x1,n ∈ X1n, n(x1|x1) denotes the number of t such that
x1,t = x1. The relative frequency {n(x1|x1)/n}x1∈X1 of the components of x1 is called the type of x1 denoted
by Px1 . The set that consists of all the types on X1 is denoted by Pn(X1). Let X1 denote an arbitrary random
variable whose distribution PX1 belongs to Pn(X1). For PX1 ∈ Pn(X1), set
Tn
X1
:=
{
x1 : Px1 = PX1
}
.
Similarly for any two n-sequences xi = xi,1 xi,2, · · · xi,n ∈ Xni , i = 1, 2, n(x1, x2|x1,x2) denotes the number of
t such that (x1,t, x2,t) = (x1, x2). The relative frequency {n(x1, x2|x1,x2)/n }(x1,x2)∈ X1×X2 of the components
of (x1,x2) is called the joint type of (x1,x2) denoted by Px1,x2 . Furthermore, the set of all the joint type of
X1 × X2 is denoted by Pn(X1 × X2). Let (X1, X2) denote an arbitrary random pair whose distribution PX1X2
belongs to Pn(X1). For PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2), set
Tn
X1X2
:= {(x1,x2) : Px1,x2 = PX1X2} .
Furthermore, for PX1 ∈ Pn (X1) and x1 ∈ TnX1 , set
Tn
X2|X1(x1) := {x2 : Px1,x2 = PX1X2} .
For set of types and joint types the following lemma holds. For the detail of the proof see Csiszár and Körner [8].
Lemma 2:
a) |Pn(X1)| ≤ (n+ 1)|X1|, |Pn(X1 ×X2)| ≤ (n+ 1)|X1||X2|.
b) For PX1 ∈ Pn(X1) and PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2),
(n+ 1)−|X1|2nH(X1) ≤ |Tn
X1
| ≤ 2nH(X1),
(n+ 1)−|X1||X2|2nH(X1X2) ≤ |Tn
X1X2
| ≤ 2nH(X1X2).
c) For any x1 ∈ TnX1 , we have
|Tn
X2|X1(x1)| =
|Tn
X1X2
|
|Tn
X1
| .
d) For x1 ∈ TnX1 and (x1,x2) ∈ T
n
X1X1
PnX1(x1) = 2
−n[H(X1)+D(PX1 ||PX1)], PnX1X2(x1,x2) = 2
−n[H(X1X2)+D(PX1X2 ||PX1X1 )].
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By Lemma 2 parts b) and d), we immediately obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3: For PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2),
PnX1X2(T
n
X1X2
) ≤ 2−nD(PX1X2 ||PX1X2 ).
B. Upper Bounds of pe(φ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) and pc(ϕ(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2)
In this subsection we evaluate upper bounds of pe(φ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) and pc(ϕ(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2). For
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2), we derive an upper bound which can be characterized with a quantity depending on (φ(n),
ψ(n)) and joint type Px1,x2 of sequences (s
n
1 , s
n
2 ) ∈ Xn1 ×Xn2 . We first evaluate pe(φ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2). For (x1,x2)
∈ Xn1 ×Xn2 and PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2) we define the following functions.
Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n)) :=
 1 if ψ
(n)
(
φ
(n)
1 (x1), φ
(n)
2 (x2)
) 6= (x1,x2) ,
0 otherwise,
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n)) :=
1
|Tn
X1X2
|
∑
(x1,x2)∈Tn
X1X2
Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n)).
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4: In the proposed system, for any pair of linear encoders φ(n) = (φ(n)1 , φ
(n)
2 ) and for any joint decoder
ψ(n), we have
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2) ≤
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))2−nD(PX1X2 ||PX1X2 ). (23)
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2)
(a)
=
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
∑
(x1,x2)∈Tn
X1X2
Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))PnX1X2(x1,x2)
=
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
1
|Tn
X1X2
|
∑
(x1,x2)∈Tn
X1X2
Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))|Tn
X1X2
|PnX1X2(x1,x2)
(b)
=
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
1
|Tn
X1X2
|
∑
(x1,x2)∈Tn
X1X2
Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))PnX1X2(T
n
X1X2
)
(c)
=
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))PnX1X2(T
n
X1X2
)
(d)
≤
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))2−nD(PX1X2 ||PX1X2 ).
Step (a) follows from the definition of Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n)). Step (b) follows from that the probabilities PnX1X2(x1,x2)
for (x1,x2) ∈ TnX1X2 take an identical value. Step (c) follows from the definition of ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n)). Step (d)
follows from lemma 3.
We next discuss upper bounds of
∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2) = I(C˜m11 , C˜m22 ;X1,X2).
On an upper bound of I(C˜m11 , C˜
m2
2 ;X1,X2), we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 5:
I(C˜m11 , C˜
m2
2 ;X1,X2) ≤ D(PK˜m11 K˜m22 ||PUm11 Um22 ), (24)
where PU1m1U2m2 represents the uniform distribution over Xm11 ×Xm22 .
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
I(C˜m11 C˜
m2
2 ;X1,X2) = H(C˜
m1
1 C˜
m2
2 )−H(C˜m11 C˜m22 |X1,X2)
(a)
= H(C˜m11 C˜
m2
2 )−H(K˜m11 K˜m11 |X1,X2)
(b)
= H(C˜m11 C˜
m2
2 )−H(K˜m11 K˜m11 )
≤ log(|Xm11 ||Xm22 |)−H(K˜m11 K˜m22 ) = D(PK˜m11 K˜m22 ||PUm11 Um22 ).
Step (a) follows from C˜mii = K˜
mi
i ⊕X˜mii and X˜mii = φ(n)i (Xi) for i = 1, 2. Step (b) follows from (K˜m11 , K˜m22 ) ⊥
(X1,X2).
To evaluate D(PK˜m11 K˜
m2
2
||PUm11 Um22 ), we define the following quantities:
Ωk1,k2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
k2
2 ) :=
{
1, if (ϕ(n)1 (k1), ϕ
(n)
2 (k2) = (k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 ),
0, otherwise
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 ) :=
1
|Tn
K1K2
|
∑
(k1,k2)∈Tn
K1K2
Ωk1,k2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 ).
From the above definition, we can regard
{
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )
}
(k˜
m1
1 ,k˜
m2
2 )∈X
m1
1 ×X
m2
2
as a probability distribution
on Xm11 ×Xm22 . We denote this probability distribution by ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) . By the definition of ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) , for PK1K2
∈ Pn(X1 ×X2), we have the following:
PK˜m11 K˜
m2
2
(k˜m11 , k˜
m2
2 ) =
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )P
n
K1K2
(Tn
K1K2
) (25)
for (k˜m11 , k˜
m2
2 ) ∈ Xm11 ×Xm22 .
Furthermore, we define
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n)) :=
∑
(k˜
m1
1 ,k˜
m2
2 )∈X
m1
1 ×X
m2
2
|X1|m1 |X2|m2
(
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )−
1
|X1|m1 |X2|m2
)2
.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6:
D(PK˜m11 K˜
m2
2
||PUm11 Um22 ) = D(Pϕ(n)1 (Kn1 )ϕ(n)2 (Kn2 )||PUm11 Um22 )
≤ (log e)[log(|X1||X2|)]n ·
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
∆∗
K1K2
(ϕ(n))2−nD(PK1K2 ||PK1K2 ), (26)
where ∆∗
K1K2
(ϕ(n)) := min{1,∆K1K2(ϕ(n))}.
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Proof: By (25) and the convexity of divergence we have
D(P
K˜1
m1K˜2
m2 ||PUm11 Um22 ) ≤
∑
(k˜
m1
1 ,k˜
m2
2 )∈X
m1
1 ×X
m2
2
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X×Y)
Pn
K1K2
(Tn
K1K2
)
× ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜m11 , k˜m22 ) log
(
|X1|m1 |X2|m2ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜m11 , k˜m22 )
)
=
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
PnK1K2(T
n
K1K2
)D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) ||PUm11 Um22 )
(a)
≤
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) ||PUm11 Um22 )2
−nD(PK1K2 ||PK1K2 ). (27)
Step (a) follows from Lemma 3. Hence, it suffices to derive an upper bound of D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) || PUm11 Um22 ). Since
D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) ||PUm11 Um22 ) = m1 log |X1|+m2 log |X2| −H(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)) ≤ [log(|X1||X2|)]n,
D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) ||PUm11 Um22 ) has the obvious upper bound [log(|X1||X2|)]n. Note that this quantity is larger than n.
We next derive another upper bound of D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) ||PUm11 Um22 ). Using that the inequality
u log(u/v) ≤ (log e){u− v + (u− v)2/v}
holds for any positive number u, v, we obtain
D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n))||PUm11 Um22 ) ≤ (log e)
∑
(k˜
m1
1 ,k˜
m2
2 )∈X
m1
1 ×X
m2
2
|X1|m1 |X2|m2
×
(
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )−
1
|X1|m1 |X2|m2
)2
= (log e) ∆K1K2(ϕ
(n)). (28)
From (28) and the upper bound [log(|X1||X2|)]n of D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) ||PUm11 Um22 ) larger than n, we have
D(ΩK1K2;ϕ(n) ||PUm11 Um22 ) ≤ (log e) [log(|X1||X2|)]nmin{1,∆K1K2(ϕ
(n))}
= (log e) [log(|X1||X2|)]n∆∗K1K2(ϕ
(n)). (29)
Combining (27) and (29), we have the bound (26) of Lemma 6.
Combining Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7: In the proposed system, for any pair of encoder ϕ(n) = (ϕ(n)1 , ϕ
(n)
2 ), for any eavesdropper A with
estimator function ψA, we have
∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2)
≤ (log e) [log(|X1||X2|)]n ·
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
∆∗
K1K2
(ϕ(n))2−nD(PK1K2 ||PK1K2 ). (30)
The bound (23) in Lemma 4 implies that upper bounds of ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n)) for PX1X2 lead to derivations
of good error bounds on pe(φ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2). Furthermore, the bound (30) in Lemma 7 implies that good upper
bounds of ∆K1K2(ϕ
(n)) for PK1K2 lead to derivations of good secure upper bounds on pc(ϕ
(n), ψA|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2
). In the next subsection we discuss an existence of universal code
(ϕ(n), ψ(n)) = (ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ψ
(n)) = (φ
(n)
1 ⊕ am11 , φ(n)2 ⊕ am22 , ψ(n))
such that the quantities ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n)) for PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1 × X2) and ∆∗K1K2(ϕ
(n)) for PK1K2 ∈ Pn(X1
×X2) attain the bound of Theorem 1.
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C. Random Coding Arguments
We construct a pair of affine encoders ϕ(n) = (ϕ(n)1 , ϕ
(n)
2 ) using the random coding method. For the joint decoder
ψ(n), we propose the minimum entropy decoder used in Csiszár [3] and Oohama and Han [9].
Random Construction of Affine Encoders: We first choose mi, i = 1, 2 such that
mi :=
⌊
nRi
log |Xi|
⌋
,
where bac stands for the integer part of a. It is obvious that for i = 1, 2, we have
Ri − 1
n
≤ mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri.
By the definition (4) of φ(n)i , i = 1, 2, we have that for each i = 1, 2 and for xi ∈ Xni ,
φ
(n)
i (xi) = xiAi,
where Ai is a matrix with n rows and mi columns. By the definition (5) of ϕ
(n)
i , i = 1, 2, we have that for each
i = 1, 2 and for ki ∈ Xni ,
ϕ
(n)
i (ki) = kiAi + b
mi
i ,
where bmii is a vector with mi columns. For each i = 1, 2, entries of Ai and b
mi
i are from the field of Xi. Those
entries are selected at random, independently of each other and with uniform distribution. Randomly constructed
linear encoders φ(n)i , i = 1, 2 and affine encoders and ϕ
(n)
i , i = 1, 2 have three properties shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 8 (Properties of Linear/Affine Encoders):
a) For each i = 1, 2, and for any xi,vi ∈ Xni with xi 6= vi, we have
Pr[φ
(n)
i (xi) = φ
(n)
i (vi)] = Pr[(yi 	wi)Ai = 0mi ] = |Xi|−mi . (31)
b) For each i = 1, 2, for any si ∈ Xni , and for any s˜mii ∈ Xmii , we have
Pr[ϕ
(n)
i (si) = s˜
mi
i ] = Pr[siAi ⊕ bmii = s˜mii ] = |Xi|−mi . (32)
c) For each i = 1, 2, for any si, ti ∈ Xni with si 6= ti, and for any s˜mii ∈ Xmii , we have
Pr[ϕ
(n)
i (si) = ϕ
(n)
i (ti) = s˜
mi
i ] = Pr[siAi ⊕ bmii = tiAi ⊕ bmii = s˜mii ] = |Xi|−2mi . (33)
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. We next define the joint decoder function ψ(n) : Xm11 × Xm22 →
Xn1 ×Xn2 . To this end we define the following quantities.
Definition 9: For (x1,x2) ∈ Xn1 ×Xn2 , we denote the conditional entropy and entropy calculated from the joint
type Px1,x2 by H(x1|x2) and H(x1x2), respectively. In other words, for a joint type PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1×X2) such
that PX1X2 = Px1,x2 , we define H(x1|x2) = H(X1|X2) and H(x1x2) = H(X1X2).
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Minimum Entropy Decoder: For φ(n)i (x
n
i ) = y˜
mi
i , i = 1, 2, we define the joint decoder function ψ
(n) : Xm11 ×
Xm22 → Xn1 ×Xn2 as follows:
ψ(n)(x˜m11 , x˜
m2
2 ) :=

(x̂1, x̂2) if φ
(n)
1 (x̂1) = x˜
m1
1 , φ
(n)
2 (x̂2) = x˜
m2
2 ,
and H(x̂1x̂2) < H(xˇ1xˇ2)
for all (xˇ1, xˇ2) such that
φ
(n)
1 (xˇ1) = x˜
m1
1 , φ
(n)
2 (xˇ2) = x˜
m2
2 ,
and (xˇ1, xˇ2) 6= (x̂1, x̂2),
arbitrary if there is no such (x̂1, x̂2) ∈ Xn1 ×Xn2 .
Error Probability Bound: In the following arguments we let expectations and variances based on the randomness
of the encoder functions be denoted by E [ ·] and Var[·], respectively. Define
ΨX1X2(R1, R2) := 2
−n[R1−H(X1|X2)]+ + 2−n[R2−H(X2|X1)]
+
+ 2−n[R1+R2−H(X1X2)]
+
.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9: For any n and for any PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2),
E
[
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))
]
≤ 4(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΨX1X2(R1, R2).
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix B.
Estimation of Approximation Error: Define
ΘK1K2(R1, R2) := 2
−n[H(K1)−R1] + 2−n[H(K2)−R2] + 2−n[H(K1K2)−(R1+R2)].
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 10: For any k˜mii ∈ Xmii , i = 1, 2
E[ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )] =
1
|X1|m1 |X2|m2 , (34)
Var[ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )] ≤
(n+ 1)|X1||X2|
|X1|2m1 |X2|2m2 ·ΘK1K2(R1, R2). (35)
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix C. We have the following corollary from Lemma 10.
Corollary 3: For any PK1K2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2), we have
E
[
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n))
]
≤ (n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΘK1K2(R1, R2).
Existence of Good Universal Code (ϕ(n), ψ(n)): From Lemma 9 and Corollary 3, we have the following lemma
stating an existence of good universal code (ϕ(n), ψ(n)).
Lemma 11: There exists at least one deterministic code (ϕ(n), ψ(n)) satisfying (mi/n) log |Xi| ≤ Ri, i = 1, 2,
such that for any PX1X2 , PK1K2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2),
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n)) ≤ 8(n+ 1)2|X1||X2|ΨX1X2(R1, R2),
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n)) ≤ 2(n+ 1)2|X1||X2|ΘK1K2(R1, R2).
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Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
E
 ∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
(
4(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΨX1X2(R1, R2)
)−1
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))
+
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
(
(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΘK1K2(R1, R2)
)−1
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n))

=
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
(
4(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΨX1X2(R1, R2)
)−1
E
[
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))
]
+
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
(
(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΘK1K2(R1, R2)
)−1
E
[
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n))
]
(a)
≤
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
1 +
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
1
(b)
≤ 2|Pn(X1 ×X2)| ≤ 2(n+ 1)|X1||X2|.
Step (a) follows from Lemma 9 and Corollary 3. Step (b) follows from Lemma 2 part a). Hence there exists at
least one deterministic code (ϕ(n), ψ(n)) such that∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
(
4(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΨX1X2(R1, R2)
)−1
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))
+
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
(
(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΘK1K2(R1, R2)
)−1
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n)) ≤ 2(n+ 1)|X1||X2|,
from which we have that(
4(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΨX1X2(R1, R2)
)−1
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n)) ≤ 2(n+ 1)|X1||X2|,(
(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΘK1K2(R1, R2)
)−1
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n)) ≤ 2(n+ 1)|X1||X2|
for any PX1X2 , PK1K2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2). Thus we have
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n)) ≤ 8(n+ 1)2|X1||X2|ΨX1X2(R1, R2),
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n)) ≤ 2(n+ 1)2|X1||X2|ΘK1K2(R1, R2)
for any PX1X2 , PK1K2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2).
D. Proof of Theorem 1
In this subsection we prove Theorem 1 using Lemma 4, Lemma 7, and Lemma 11.
Proof of Theorem 1: By Lemma 11, there exists (ϕ(n), ψ(n)) satisfying (mi/n) log |Xi| ≤ Ri, i = 1, 2, such
that for any PX1X2 , PK1K2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2),
ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n)) ≤ 8(n+ 1)2|X1||X2|ΨX1X2(R1, R2), (36)
∆K1K2(ϕ
(n)) ≤ 2(n+ 1)|X1||X2|ΘK1K2(R1, R2). (37)
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We first prove (9) in Theorem 1. On an upper bound of pe(φ(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2), we have the following chain of
inequalities:
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|PnX1X2)
(a)
≤ 8(n+ 1)2|X1||X2|
∑
PX1X2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
ΨX1X2(R1, R2)2
−nD(PX1X2 ||PX1X2 )
(b)
≤ 24(n+ 1)2|X1||X2||Pn(X1 ×X2)|2−n[mini=1,2,3 Fi(Ri|PX1X2 )]
(c)
≤ 24(n+ 1)3|X1||X2|2−nF (R1,R2|PX1X2 ) = 2−n[F (R1,R2|PX1X2 )−δ1,n].
Step (a) follows from Lemma 4 and (36). Step (b) follows from that for any PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2),
ΨX1X2(R1, R2)2
−nD(PX1X2 ||PX1X2 )
=
{
2−n[R1−H(X1|X2)]
+
+ 2−n[R2−H(X2|X1)]
+
+ 2−n[R1+R2−H(X1X2)]
+
}
· 2−nD(PX1X2 ||PX1X2 )
≤ 3 · 2−n[mini=1,2,3 Fi(Ri|PX1X2 )].
Step (c) follows from Lemma 2 part a). We next prove (10) in Theorem 1. On an upper bound of ∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 ,
PnK1K2) we have the following chain of inequalities:
∆(n)(ϕ(n)|PnX1X2 , PnK1K2)
(a)
≤ 2(log e)[log(|X1||X2|)]n(n+ 1)2|X1||X2|
∑
PK1K2
∈Pn(X1×X2)
min
[
1,ΘK1K2(R1, R2)
]
2−nD(PX1X2 ||PX1X2 )
(b)
≤ 6(log e)[log(|X1||X2|)]n(n+ 1)2|X1||X2||Pn(X1 ×X2)|2−n[min{G1(R1|PK1 ),G2(R2|PK2 ),G3(R3|PK1K2 )]
(c)
≤ 6(log e)[log(|X1||X2|)]n(n+ 1)3|X1||X2|2−nG(R1,R2|PK1K2 ) = 2−n[G(R1,R2|PK1K2 )−δ2,n].
Step (a) follows from Lemma 7 and (37). Step (b) follows from that for any PX1X2 ∈ Pn(X1 ×X2), we have
min
{
1,ΘK1K2(R1, R2)
}
2−nD(PK1K2 ||PK1K2 )
= min
{
1, 2−n[H(K1)−R1] + 2−n[H(K2)−R2] + 2−n[H(K1K2)−(R1+R2)]
}
2−nD(PK1K2 ||PK1K2 )
≤
{
2−n[H(K1)−R1]
+
+ 2−n[H(K2)−R2]
+
+ 2−n[H(K1K2)−(R1+R2)]
+
}
2−nD(PK1K2 ||PK1K2 )
≤ 3 · 2−n[min{G1(R1|PK1 ),G2(R2|PK2 ),G3(R3|PK1K2 )}].
Step (c) follows from Lemma 2 part a).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 8
In this appendix we prove Lemma 8. The suffix i in Xi used to distinguish X1 and X2 in Lemma 8 is not
essential for the proof. In the following argument we omit this suffix. Let X be a finite field and let Λ be an n×n
invertible matrix, whose entries are from X . Let φ : Xn → Xm be a linear map with φ(xΛ) = xΛA for x ∈ Xn.
Here A is a matrix with n rows and m colomus. Let ϕ : Xn → Xm be an affine map with ϕ(s) = sA ⊕ bm
for s ∈ Xn. Here bm is a vectorx with m colomus. Entries of A and bm are from the field of X . Those entries
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are selected at random, independently of each other and with uniform distribution. In this appendix we prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 12:
a) For any x,v ∈ Xn with x 6= v, we have
Pr[φ(x) = φ(v)] = Pr[(x	 v)A = 0m] = |X |−m. (38)
b) For any s ∈ Xn, and for any s˜m ∈ Xm, we have
Pr[ϕ(s) = s˜m] = Pr[sA⊕ bm = s˜m] = |X |−m. (39)
c) For any s, t ∈ Xn with s 6= t, and for any s˜m ∈ Xm, we have
Pr[ϕ(s) = ϕ(t) = s˜m] = Pr[sA⊕ bm = tA⊕ bm = s˜m] = |X |−2m. (40)
Proof: Let aml be the l-th low vector of the matrix A. For each l = 1, 2, · · · , n, let Aml ∈ Xm be a random
vector which represents the randomness of the choice of aml ∈ Xm. Let Bm ∈ Xm be a random vector which
represent the randomness of the choice of bm ∈ Xm. We first prove the part a). Since Λ is invertible, we have
x 6= v ⇔ xi 6= vi for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Without loss of generality we may assume x1 6= v1. Under this assumption we have the following:
(x	 v)A = 0m ⇔
n∑
l=1
(xl 	 vl)aml = 0m ⇔ am1 =
n∑
l=2
wl 	 xl
x1 	 w1 a
m
l . (41)
Computing Pr[φ(x) = φ(v)], we have the following chain of equalities:
Pr[φ(x) = φ(v)] = Pr[(x	 v)A = 0m] (a)= Pr
[
am1 =
n∑
l=2
vl 	 xl
x1 	 v1 a
m
l
]
(b)
=
∑
{aml }nl=2
∈X (n−1)m
n∏
l=2
PAml (a
m
l )PAm1
(
n∑
l=2
wl 	 yl
y1 	 w1 a
m
l
)
= |X |−m
∑
{aml }nl=2
∈X (n−1)m
n∏
l=2
PAml (a
m
l ) = |X |−m.
Step (a) follows from (41). Step (b) follows from that n random vecotors Aml , l = 1, 2, · · · , n are independent. We
next prove the part b). We have the following:
sA⊕ bm = s˜m ⇔ bm = s˜m 	
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
}
. (42)
Computing Pr[sA⊕ bm = s˜m], we have the following chain of equalities:
Pr[sA⊕ bm = s˜m] (a)= Pr
[
bm = s˜m 	
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
}]
(b)
=
∑
{aml }nl=1
∈Xnm
n∏
l=1
PAml (a
m
l )PBm
(
s˜m 	
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
})
= |X |−m
∑
{aml }nl=1
∈Xnm
n∏
l=1
PAml (a
m
l ) = |X |−m.
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Step (a) follows from (42). Step (b) follows from that n random vecotors Aml , l = 1, 2, · · · , n and Bm are indepen-
dent. We finally prove the part c). We first observe that s 6= t⇔ is equivalent to si 6= ti for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that s1 6= t1. Under this assumption we have the following:
sA⊕ bm = tA⊕ bm = s˜m ⇔ (s	 t)A = 0, bm = s˜m 	
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
}
⇔ am1 =
n∑
l=2
tl 	 sl
s1 	 t1 a
m
l , b
m = s˜m 	
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
}
⇔ am1 =
n∑
l=2
tl 	 sl
s1 	 t1 a
m
l , b
m = s˜m ⊕
n∑
l=2
t1sl 	 s1tl
s1 	 t1 a
m
l . (43)
Computing Pr[sA⊕ bm = tA⊕ bm = s˜m], we have the following chain of equalities:
Pr[sA⊕ bm = tA⊕ bm = s˜m]
(a)
= Pr
[
am1 =
n∑
l=2
tl 	 sl
s1 	 t1 a
m
l ∧ bm = s˜m ⊕
n∑
l=2
t1sl 	 s1tl
s1 	 t1 a
m
l
]
(b)
=
∑
{aml }nl=2
∈X (n−1)m
[
n∏
l=2
PAml (a
m
l )
]
PAm1
(
n∑
l=2
tl 	 sl
s1 	 t1 a
m
l
)
PBm
(
s˜m ⊕
n∑
l=2
t1sl 	 s1tl
s1 	 t1 a
m
l
)
= |X |−2m
∑
{aml }nl=2
∈X (n−1)m
n∏
l=2
PAml (a
m
l ) = |X |−2m.
Step (a) follows from (43). Step (b) follows from the independent property on Aml , l = 1, 2, · · · , n and Bm.
B. Proof of Lemma 9
For simplicity of notation, we write Mi = |Xi|mi , i = 1, 2. We also use those notations in the arguments of other
appendixes.
Proof of Lemma 9: For x1 ∈ Xn1 ,x2 ∈ Xn2 we set
B(x1x2) =
{
(xˇ1, xˇ2) : H(xˇ1xˇ2) ≤ H(x1x2) , Pxˇ1 = Px1 , Pxˇ2 = Px2
}
,
B(x1|x2) =
{
xˇ1 : H(xˇ1|x2) ≤ H(x1|x2), Pxˇ1 = Px1
}
,
B(x2|x1) =
{
xˇ2 : H(xˇ2|x1) ≤ H(x2|x1), Pxˇ2 = Px2
}
.
Using parts a) and b) of Lemma 2, we have following inequalities:
|B(x1x2)| ≤ (n+ 1)|X1||X2|2nH(x1x2), (44)
|B(x1|x2)| ≤ (n+ 1)|X1||X2|2nH(x1|x2), (45)
|B(x2|x1)| ≤ (n+ 1)|X1||X2|2H(x2|x1). (46)
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On an upper bound of E[Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))], we have the following chain of inequalities:
E[Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))]
≤
∑
xˇ1∈B(x1|x2),
xˇ1 6=x1
Pr
{
φ
(n)
1 (xˇ1) = φ
(n)
1 (x1)
}
+
∑
xˇ2∈B(x2|x1),
xˇ2 6=x2
Pr
{
φ
(n)
2 (xˇ2) = φ
(n)
2 (x2)
}
+
∑
(xˇ1,xˇ2)∈B(x1x2),
xˇ1 6=x1,xˇ2 6=x2
Pr
{
φ
(n)
1 (xˇ1) = φ
(n)
1 (x1), φ
(n)
2 (xˇ2) = φ
(n)
2 (x2)
}
(a)
≤
∑
xˇ1∈B(x1|x2)
1
M1
+
∑
xˇ2∈B(x2|x1)
1
M2
+
∑
(xˇ1,xˇ2)∈B(x1x2)
1
M1M2
=
|B(x1|x2)|
M1
+
|B(x2|x1)|
M2
+
|B(x1x2)|
M1M2
(b)
≤ 4(n+ 1)|X1||X2|
{
2−n[R1−H(x1|x2)] + 2−n[R2−H(x2|x1)] + 2−n[R1+R2−H(x1x2)]
}
.
Step (a) follows from Lemma 8 part a) and independent random constructions of linear encoders φ(n)1 and φ
(n)
2 .
Step (b) follows from (44), (45), (46), and Mi ≥ 2nRi−1, i = 1, 2. On the other hand we have the obvious bound
E[Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))] ≤ 1. Hence we have
E[Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))]
≤ 4(n+ 1)|X1||X2|
{
2−n[R1−H(x1|x2)]
+
+ 2−n[R2−H(x2|x1)]
+
+ 2−n[R1+R2−H(x1x2)]
+
}
.
Hence we have
E[ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))] = E
 1|Tn
X1X2
|
∑
(x1,x2)∈Tn
X1X2
Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))

=
1
|Tn
X1X2
|
∑
(x1,x2)∈Tn
X1X2
E[Ξx1,x2(φ
(n), ψ(n))]
≤ 4(n+ 1)|X1||X2|
{
2−n[R1−H(X1|X2)]
+
+ 2−n[R2−H(X2|X1)]
+
+ 2−n[R1+R2−H(X1X2)]
+
}
,
completing the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 10
Proof of Lemma 10: We first compute the expectation of ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 ). We obtain the following:
E
[
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )
]
= E
 1|Tn
K1K2
|
∑
(k1,k2)∈Tn
K1K2
Ωk1,k2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )

=
1
|Tn
K1K2
|
∑
(k1,k2)∈Tn
K1K2
E
[
Ωk1,k2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )
]
(a)
=
1
|Tn
K1K2
|
∑
(k1,k2)∈Tn
K1K2
1
M1M2
=
1
M1M2
.
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Step (a) follows from Lemma 8 part b) and independent random constructions of affine encoders ϕ(n)1 and ϕ
(n)
2 .
Thus (34) is proved. Next, we prove (35). We have the following chain of equalities:
|Tn
K1K2
|2E
[(
ΩK1K2(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )
)2]
=
∑
(k1,k2)∈Tn
K1K2
∑
(k̂1,k̂2)∈Tn
K1K2
E
[
Ωk1,k2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )Ωk̂1,k̂2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )
]
(a)
=
∑
(k1,k2)∈Tn
K1K2
1
M1M2
+
∑
k1∈TnK1 ,
k2 6=k̂2∈TnK2|K1 (k1)
1
M1M22
+
∑
k2∈TnK2 ,
k1 6=k̂1∈TnK1|K2 (k2)
1
M21M2
+
∑
(k1,k2)∈TnK1K2 ,
(k̂1,k̂2)∈TnK1K2 ,
k1 6=k̂1,k2 6=k̂2
1
M21M
2
2
≤
|Tn
K1K2
|
M1M2
+
∑
k1∈TnK1
|Tn
K2|K1(k1)|
2
M1M22
+
∑
k2∈TnK2
|Tn
K1|K2(k2)|
2
M21M2
+
|Tn
K1K2
|2
M21M
2
2
(b)
=
|Tn
K1K2
|
M1M2
+
|Tn
K1
||Tn
K1K2
|2
|Tn
K1
|2M1M22
+
|Tn
K2
||Tn
K1K2
|2
|Tn
K2
|2M21M2
+
|Tn
K1K2
|2
M21M
2
2
=
|Tn
K1K2
|2
M21M
2
2
{
M1M2
|Tn
K1K2
| +
M1
|Tn
K1
| +
M2
|Tn
K2
| + 1
}
. (47)
Step (a) follows from Lemma 8 part c) and independent random constructions of affine encoders ϕ(n)1 and ϕ
(n)
2 .
Step (b) follows from Lemma 2 part c). Hence we have
Var
[(
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )
)2]
= E
[(
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )
)2]
−
(
E
[
ΩK1K2;ϕ(n)(k˜
m1
1 , k˜
m2
2 )
])2
≤ 1
M21M
2
2
{
M1M2
|Tn
K1K2
| +
M1
|Tn
K1
| +
M2
|Tn
K2
|
}
(a)
≤ 1
M21M
2
2
{
2n(R1+R2)
|Tn
K1K2
| +
2nR1
|Tn
K1
| +
2nR2
|Tn
K2
|
}
(b)
≤ (n+ 1)
|X1||X2|
M21M
2
2
{
2−n[H(K1K2)−(R1+R2)] + 2−n[H(K1)−R1] + 2−n[H(K2)−R2]
}
.
Step (a) follows from Mi ≤ 2nRi , i = 1, 2. Step (b) follows from Lemma 2 part b).
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